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the fairness and efficiency of the welfare arrangements came to the forefront 
of public discussions and political contestation. The key questions concerned 
the type of welfare state arising on the ruins of the old state-socialist regime. 
The author investigates whether new welfare state resembles any of the “three 
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of these measures in overall economic transformation. The author argues that 
the consequences of these measures in social policy, most notably increased 
poverty, though often considered as transitory, proved to be more permanent. 
Also, economic recovery has not brought the improvement of social services 
and local welfare assistance as expected. The second part of the paper offers 
a critical review of causes that brought about such a contrast between the 
declared goals and the actual results of the reform. The author argues that, 
contrary to the initial expectations of increased efficiency, batter targeting, 
and more social justice, the combined steps of funding cuts and decentraliza-
tion of decisions failed to decrease poverty, while at the same time increased 
stigmatizing of recipients. The author concludes that Hungary’s recent devel-
opments point toward the crystallization of a distinguishable fourth type of 
the welfare state developing more or less independently from the influence of 
supranational welfare arrangements of the EU.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Backed by the controversial experiences 
of the decade-long history of post-com-
munist transformation, a range of pressing 
questions on the fairness and efficiency 
of the prevailing arrangements in welfare 
came to the forefront of public discussions 
by the late 1990s in Hungary. The arising 
debates were fuelled by widely shared dis-
appointments. Criticisms of the undimin-
ished insecurity of daily living, the unjust 
and lasting sacrifices that “ordinary people” 
have had to make in the coupled processes 
of marketization and privatization, and also 
for the evidenced incompetence of the new 
democratic institutions of governance to 
halt the unstoppable growth of inequali-
ties and the spreading of deep poverty all 
around have become increasingly sharper. 
The preparation for accessing (since then: 
joining) the European Union has turned 
these accusations to acute political conflicts 
about the envisioned scope, role, and com-
petence of the country’s future “European-
ized” state. With an eye on the inescapable 
structural reforms, and at the same time, 
well aware of the current limitations on 
maneuvering, politicians, policy-makers, 
scholars and diverse vocal groups of the 
general public have urged a thorough and 
critical exploration of the causes behind the 
serious shortcomings of the near past in or-
der to better navigate the country amid the 
altered conditions of the enlargement. 
The key questions brought up for con-
sideration are the following: What type 
of welfare state has arisen on the ruins of 
the old state-socialist regime? What have 
been the consequences of the unequivocally 
claimed rapid institutional decomposition 
of the once omnipotent party-state with its 
all-embracing domination over the lives 
of its subjects? Have the recently evolved 
democratic arrangements and the constitu-
tional acknowledgement of basic citizens’ 
rights concluded in the advancement of a 
new Western-type welfare state? If they 
have: do the new structures resemble any 
of the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” 
so eloquently outlined by Esping-Andersen 
some 15 years ago (1990)? If they have 
not: are the departures merely a matter of 
time and economic growth? Or, are there 
deep-rooted systemic causes, ill-shaped 
policies, and sharp social conflicts in the 
background of failing to fulfil the funda-
mental functions of welfare in compromis-
ing labour and general well-being, regulat-
ing and controlling inequalities, and provid-
ing the necessary safeguards to prevent so-
cial exclusion and political disintegration? 
Are the deplorable records of the Hungarian 
welfare state due solely to the unfavourable 
external conditions of the otherwise press-
ing task of economic adjustment, or does 
one have to seek the explanation in the 
retardant historical heritages and binding 
structural deficiencies still at play?
It is perhaps needless to argue at length 
why these questions are of great importance 
for the theoretical and political concerns 
alike. As to the theoretical implications, by 
exploring the deep-rooted causes behind the 
prevailing massive socio-economic segre-
gation that proves resistant to any welfare 
policies for tackling poverty and social ex-
clusion, studies of the post-communist wel-
fare regimes can inspire the revision of ear-
lier assumed one-to-one relations between 
certain policies/measures and actual social 
development. Further, these discussions 
can bring to the forefront a rather rich set of 
formerly unidentified interests, traditions, 
customs and attitudes with a great and un-
mediated impact on the shaping of welfare. 
Thereby, they can significantly enrich our 
scholarly understanding of the socio-politi-
cal, economic and cultural functions that 
welfare policies can convey much beyond 
their ascribed professional roles. 
The political implications of the above 
short list of questions seem to be of equal 
Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006.
311
Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...
importance. Whether the post-communist 
societies of East and Central Europe actu-
ally develop toward fitting into one of the 
coveted models of Western democratic 
capitalism, or they take their own route 
with meaningful departures – this is a mat-
ter with far-reaching consequences beyond 
the boundaries of the affected nation states. 
After all, unmet social rights, socio-eco-
nomically founded sharp discrimination in 
practicing political rights, rapidly expand-
ing economic and social marginalization, 
and the subsequent endangerment of social 
cohesion in a cluster of societies beyond the 
Elbe also have multifaceted implications 
for the West. In the short run, the gradual 
departure of Europe’s “new democracies” 
from the main track of modern welfare 
state development – often conceptualized 
by the Western public as “ethno-cultural 
otherness”1 – feeds Euro-skepticism and 
weakens the democratic attempts within the 
EU to speed up the integration beyond the 
free flow of capital. In the longer run, the 
departing “worlds of welfare capitalism” 
might end up in providing legitimization 
to policies on freezing (or, at least, seri-
ously restricting) the free move of citizens, 
closing the “European border” before the 
eyes of migrants and refugees from the po-
litically shaken and/or poorer parts of the 
world, and (re)creating the invisible walls 
of separation much in ideological-political 
concordance with the once so extensively 
suffered cold war. In short, the direction in 
which the welfare states of the so-called 
post-communist region develop is a critical 
matter for all of us: successful adjustment 
might carry promising potentials, while his-
torically-structurally informed departures 
might bring about disastrous limitations for 
the future of the entirety of the “old conti-
nent” and beyond.
Obviously, the above questions and 
their broad implications cannot be explored 
at once, and certainly not by a single author 
in a single paper. My aim is much more lim-
ited here. Through the study of the Hungar-
ian developments of the past decade and a 
half, I will present a case with lasting de-
partures from the classical paths of welfare 
state formation where the deviations can be 
studied in their making. As I will argue, 
the root of the departures can be identi-
fied in the unprecedented historical task of 
converting the one-time party-state and its 
planned economy to a modern democracy 
with the unchallenged domination of the 
market, and what is more, to accomplish 
the swift conversion with one and the same 
motion in all the decisive fields of political, 
economic and social life. 
Although the rapid decomposition of 
the old institutions was a unanimous claim 
articulated by all the major political actors 
at the start of the transition, it has led, how-
ever, to unforeseen troublesome results. The 
process has quickly turned to the desertion 
of the state (Standing, 1997.), and simulta-
neously, to the strengthening of sharpened 
social struggles over its remnants. A most 
serious consequence of these developments 
has been the evolvement of a dual structure 
with the increasingly deeper captivation of 
the coexisting corporatist and liberal drives 
to utilize the state’s power and resources 
for providing protection on the market, and 
simultaneously, “freeing” the state from 
its classical welfare commitments toward 
the poor. Soon these developments have 
concluded into the effective ghettoization 
1 There are clear indications in the Western press of intensifying hostility and suspicion toward the East-Cen-
tral European “newcomers” in the core countries of the founders of the EU (first of all, in Germany and the UK). 
Most probably, these symptoms are  rightly conceptualized by a number of sociologists and political scientists 
as the manifestations of a new variant of white racism against whites (Minutes of the Workshop..., 2005.).
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of welfare, which in turn, has accentuated 
the processes of marginalization and social 
disintegration. 
As I will attempt to show, the structur-
ally ingrained duality of the state’s welfare 
functions and the concomitant evolvement 
of a corporatist-liberal mix in policy-mak-
ing are not accidental and easily alterable 
outcomes. In the light of them, it is prob-
ably justifiable to call for a revision of our 
conceptualization of the existing worlds 
of modern welfare capitalism. There seem 
to be good reasons to look at the Hungar-
ian case as an example of the historically 
informed construction of a fourth distinc-
tive model. 
In building up the argument, I will first 
briefly outline the major steps taken in the 
field of welfare to assist the grandiose task 
of post-communist transformation. I will 
present the ideological foundations and 
the political rationales behind the drastic 
restructuring while simultaneous financial 
impoverishment of the state’s provisions 
to serve the two twinned primary goals of 
the time: the swift transformation of the 
property-relations through massive priva-
tization, and the speeding up of the insti-
tutional transition from a planned toward a 
market-ruled economy. The consequences 
on diverting the prevailing redistributive 
policies and welfare institutions to com-
pensate for the losses of the impoverishing 
middle-class, while assisting adjustment to 
the market will be demonstrated through a 
quick overview of the binding historical 
heritages of late socialism in their efficient 
conversion into powerful forms of interest 
representation during the changeover. The 
simultaneous implications on the steady 
growth and deepened socio-economic seg-
regation of poverty will be shown through a 
closer look at the overt and covert functions 
of decentralized welfare provisions con-
structed for those who remained excluded 
from the nationwide bargaining process 
over the public resources: the poor. 
The final part of the paper will attempt 
to draw some general conclusions. By 
confronting the findings with Esping-An-
dersen’s characterization of the decisive 
traits of the corporatist and liberal models, 
respectively, I will point to the distinctive 
nature of the new Hungarian welfare state 
as the one being founded on their mix. As 
I will argue, the blend is different from its 
constituents: some features of the originals 
simply disappear, while others mingle in 
utterly new arrangements. This is why it 
seems to me problematic to characterize 
the Hungarian case plainly as a stage on 
the developmental ladder. If I am right, 
it is more appropriate to conceive it as a 
distinguishable fourth world of welfare 
capitalism, though still in the process of 
crystallization.
POST-COMMUNIST WELFARE 
REFORMS AND THE RISE OF A 
DUAL ORDER 
Upon the collapse of communist state-
socialism, the rapid dismantling of the 
once omnipotent state was seen, as said, 
as the key to achieve a genuine systemic 
turnover in Hungary (as well as in all other 
societies earlier under Soviet rule). In this 
unprecedented historic process, deep-go-
ing reforms of social security and welfare 
were put high on the agenda as those among 
the few unquestionable preconditions of 
genuine change. The urgency to meaning-
fully limit the presence of the central state 
in these areas was reasoned by a range of 
serious legal and financial considerations. 
As to the legal aspects, it was a widely 
shared view among domestic and foreign 
advisors, economists, financial experts, etc. 
that, without cutting off the strong bond be-
tween the centrally administered schemes 
of redistribution and the individuals’ en-
titlements for benefits and provisions, the 
very essence of the systemic transformation 
would be jeopardized: neither the reallo-
Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006.
313
Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...
cation of properties2, nor the recruitment 
of labour, nor free entrepreneurship as the 
fundaments of marketization were to be 
successfully launched otherwise. As to the 
financial side, the equally widely shared 
views on the former “premature welfare 
state” (Kornai, 1996.) implied that welfare 
expenditures had occupied a too heavy 
weight in the yearly state budget of the 
late 1980s, hence upon the turnover, they 
should be substantially reduced in order to 
reapportion funds for the primary purposes 
of transforming economic management ac-
cording to the rules of the market, and fur-
ther, also for substantiating modernization 
and economic adjustment.3 
But another important principle behind 
advocating revolutionary reforms in the 
broadly meant sphere of welfare was to in-
crease social justice and efficiency. It was 
a recurring motif of the criticism of social 
policy in the late period of communist state-
socialism that – contrary to the declared 
goals of the regime – central redistribution, 
strictly linked to employment, acted rather 
to increase income inequalities than towards 
moderating them. Moreover, by originating 
entitlements from compulsory full employ-
ment, the misconstrued concept of “univer-
salism” implied massive social injustices 
through also regu larly canalizing the sub-
stantial provisions to the relatively prosper-
ous strata of society. Therefore, when laying 
down the principles of the new welfare sys-
tem, it was one of the fundamental goals to 
eliminate “waste” – in plain terms, to ensure 
that only those really in need received sup-
plementary sources through redistribution 
and only to the extent of their neediness. It 
could be hoped that with all this, the new 
system became not only more targeted but 
also more just: public money was to be spent 
only to meet the needs acknowledged by 
consensus, and only for those falling behind 
the widely agreed level of neediness. At the 
same time, the fortunate majority above this 
invisible, yet generally acknowledged line 
of true poverty was presumed to follow 
other paths opened up and regulated by the 
market (contribution-based provisions of 
social security; private pension-schemes; 
market-related benefits in health care, etc.). 
Hence, the new arrangements were thought 
to automatically keep apart the two pur-
posefully designed sub-systems with their 
clear-cut mechanisms of distribution to meet 
two distinctively, but justly defined sets of 
demands.
The technical and practical considera-
tions underlying the transformation were 
linked to the assertion of these new ideas 
of justice and efficiency. While the univer-
salistic considerations and welfare aspects 
of the centrally distributed provisions and 
social security benefits weakened strikingly 
with the introduction of a sequence of new 
regulations, the dramatically reshaped divi-
sion of roles between the central bodies of 
welfare distribution and the newly empow-
ered local authorities4 left the definition of 
2 Although the process is customarily called “privatization”, in order to stress its fundamental difference 
from the respective Western-type version, it would be more accurate to call it “property re-establishment”. After 
all, the essence of the operation lies in two coordinated sets of action: in denominating owners in substitution 
of the once faceless all-encompassing ownership of the communist party-state on the one hand, and in dividing 
the “wealth of the nation” among them, on the other. In contrast, privatization in the Western sense of the term 
means an ordinary market-transaction between two identifiable actors, the state as the seller and the future ow-
ner(s) as buyer(s). 
3 Claims on restructuring the state budget and allocating substantial parts of it for “upgrading” the state’s 
properties prior to privatization where further accentuated by the severe indebtedness of the country and the 
chronic shortage of domestic capital. 
4 Beside considerations on more efficient and less wasteful economizing with the scarce public funds, drama-
tic decentralization – and the concomitant substantial empowerment of the local governments to make decisions 
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the scope and content of “customarily ac-
knowledged” needs to thousands of distinct 
urban and rural communities. With this, 
the new decrees implied that in the area of 
needs at the most minimum rules could be 
set up with general validity, but at the same 
time it was also made clear that henceforth 
the central state was not prepared to give 
either legal or financial guarantees for their 
satisfaction. 
The new principles and their imple-
mentation proved extremely efficient: the 
change was sweeping. Within just a few 
years, a logically constructed, fully-fledged 
welfare regime has evolved with two dis-
tinct sub-systems. Put into clear legal and 
institutional arrangements, it is by now the 
rules of the market that navigate people 
with regular earnings and/or interests to 
business-related benefits, tax-reductions, 
contribution-driven social security provi-
sions etc. in the first sub-system, while it 
is primarily a range of locally defined and 
gravely limited welfare provisions that are 
to complete (or entirely substitute for) the 
scarce, irregular and low earnings, unem-
ployment benefits and other temporary 
incomes in the second. In other words, 
with the dual arrangement put in work, it 
is in fact a dualistic vision of two coexist-
ing but separated societies that has been 
firmly institutionalized: one for the “ordi-
nary” people quickly adapting to the new 
dominates of the market and another for the 
incapable poor. 
Thus far and at a first superficial glance, 
one can greet here the victory of neoliber-
alism: after all, it is exactly the dividing 
line of success/failure on the market that 
provides the justification to direct people 
within the above mutually exclusive ar-
rangements of welfare.5 However, at a 
deeper scrutiny, the picture significantly 
changes when looking at the role that the 
state plays in making the division. Then it 
becomes clear that it is not the market per 
se, but the marketized shares drawn from 
the state’s revenue at the expense of wel-
fare that are at work in the background. In 
other words, the dual arrangements in wel-
fare do not arise from a clear separation of 
the market and the state; instead they reflect 
deep socio-political inequalities in access 
to power over the state, and help to man-
age the long-term rivalry of the affluent and 
the poor for the very same scarce resources 
and institutions. 
Let me briefly outline how such a 
strange development has come about. The 
origins date back to the social history of 
the 1980s. By that time, Hungary’s great 
invention, the so-called second economy 
became an integral part of the working 
of the old regime. As a number of studies 
convincingly demonstrated, the way of life 
put on two pillars (that is, to base livelihood 
on work in the formal, state-regulated seg-
ment of the economy in combination with 
an intensive participation in the family-run 
micro-level productive endeavours) became 
a model followed by no less than some 
three-quarters of the households (Szelényi, 
1988.; Kemény, 1991.; Juhász, 1991.; Gá-
bor, 1992.; Vajda, 1992.; Laki, 1998.). The 
widespread practice had numerous fruitful 
consequences that importantly contributed 
to Hungary’s pioneering position among the 
transitional economies of the 1990s. Just to 
mention a few: the second economy became 
the major vehicle of modernizing the coun-
in a wide range of public matters – was seen as the embodiment of the concerted determination of genuinely 
driving back the central state as the source of potential subjugation.
5 Whether one likes such an arrangement is an utterly different matter. Here it is my sole aim to state that, 
as to their appearance, the rapidly introduced new welfare arrangements seemed to be in full concordance with 
the strong neoliberal claims of such powerful institutions as the IMF or the World Bank. – We will see soon that 
the appearance was rather misleading.
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try’s services and infrastructure; it served 
as a workshop for acquiring craftsmanship 
and market-related skills for later use in en-
trepreneurial activities; the released flow of 
accumulated assets and savings, once fro-
zen under political coercion, later helped 
to overcome the sudden drop of livelihood 
amidst the severe transitional crisis of the 
early 1990s. 
However, these positive traits were but 
just one side of the coin. For one cannot be 
blind to the fact that the forced and lasting 
cohabitation of the two economies also had 
some deeply problematic implications. In 
the context of the current discussion, it is 
the creation and reproduction of the hardly 
separable relation between the state and the 
market that requires special attention. 
Given the unquestionable domination 
of the rules and requirements of the state-
controlled first economy above the second, 
the scope, time and energy that people could 
devote to their productive activities in the 
private sphere had to be adjusted – better to 
say: subordinated – to the pulsation of the 
planned sector. Further, their participation 
was never a matter of innate rights, but that 
of politically conditioned permissions. One 
had to deserve the tacit consent of the chiefs 
for temporarily being away from the social-
ist workplace for fulfilling some pressing 
productive tasks “at home”, and had to be 
aware that such consents were immediately 
withdrawn upon the slightest indication 
of “disloyalty”. As a consequence of the 
endless bargaining amidst the undefined 
and slippery rules of the game, a constant 
struggle has been waged to shift the invis-
ible borderline between the two economies 
and make the concessions for quasi-private 
business a matter of acknowledged rights. 
This nationwide silent movement was prob-
ably the most important collective deed of 
Hungarians in the post-1956 decades; it 
proved compelling enough for the ruling 
Party to induce a number of smart innova-
tions to prevent political discontent with 
unpredictable implications.6 
Most of these innovations were intro-
duced in the field of social policy. Gradu-
ally more and more steps were taken to 
“reinterpret” the functions of the existing 
benefit schemes and services and make 
them accessible as legalized channels for 
temporary withdrawal from the state em-
ployment amid the otherwise maintained 
framework of compulsory full employ-
ment. Hence, disability pensions became 
a tacitly acknowledged legal path for early 
retirement in order to intensify production 
in home-based agriculture (Szalai, 1991.); 
the three-year long child care leave became 
a state-financed period for home-based 
service-work (Vajda, 1997.); sick-leave 
was greatly utilized to provide live labour 
for private house-building or gardening 
(Farkas and Vajda, 1988.), etc. These and 
similar reinterpretations made it clear from 
the outset that it was not only the time 
frame of private production that became 
semi-legalized this way. As to the endur-
ing consequences, the ways and forms of 
the involved financial contributions were 
probably even of greater importance. For it 
was an ever increasing portion of the public 
funds in social security and state-provided 
welfare that were canalised to private pro-
duction: they became customarily used as 
“salaries” for unpaid informal work, and/or 
as extra payments in addition to one’s (oth-
6 The unceasing fear from a repeated revolution was the single most powerful guiding principle of the 
Communist Party’s rule throughout the post-1956 decades. The 33 years history of the “jolliest barrack” of the 
(Soviet) camp – as Hungary was ironically called from the late 1960s onwards – cannot be understood without 
the delicate compromise that those regaining power on points of Soviet bayonets tried to establish with the de-
feated revolutionary nation. The core of this compromise was to “liberalize” coercion to the very limits of the 
regime while maintain it to the very essence of it.
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erwise low) earnings in the formal sphere. 
Though this way a rapid erosion of the 
benefit-schemes has evolved to the detri-
ment of those living solely or mainly from 
such sources, and henceforth the political 
innovations had their grave contribution to 
the spreading of poverty by the late 1980s 
(Szalai, 1990.), but the most severe con-
sequence came to the light only later. For 
the most troublesome development was the 
unnoticed (and certainly unintended) joint-
ing of the two distinct systems that never 
again could be broken up.7 The structurally 
constructed engagement of the state and the 
market has long survived the motifs that 
had called it into being. However, this is 
no surprise. As I will show below, there is 
a wide range of old and new, transient and 
lasting interests that provide the backing to 
maintain it at all costs.8 
In the first place, the economic motives 
are obvious. Independent economic activity 
entirely separated from the state requires a 
stable capital backing and a firmly estab-
lished market, but neither of these condi-
tions could be created in the preceding dec-
ades of state-socialism. As mentioned, the 
freeing of the frozen assets and concealed 
savings driven from prior years-long work 
in the second economy were enough, at 
best, to provide funding only for the en-
trepreneurial start-ups upon the systemic 
turn. However, they proved seriously in-
adequate for continuous financing, capital 
investment, technical innovation, market-
ing, etc. In brief, the mere survival of the 
domestic business, and together with it, the 
country’s potentials to keep pace with the 
sharpened competition on the world market 
have been at permanent risk. This is why 
the need for the state pillar in the raw mate-
rial sense has been a built-in constituent of 
Hungarian embourgeoisement ever since. 
In a rather early recognition of the fact, 
Hungarian entrepreneurs have thus arrived 
at a general consensus that it was a primary 
duty of the state to take the responsibility 
for their success, as well as it was its moral 
obligation to pay back the stolen decades, 
and provide enduring support for catch-
ing up. And this is why, in clear reflection 
of their common interests, self-employed 
craftsmen and owners of the largest do-
mestic firms were ready to promptly unite 
in encompassing chambers and business-
associations that have grown influential 
and powerful enough to become the prime 
partners of the subsequent governments 
irrespective of their political stands. Thus 
the new Hungarian bourgeoisie has attained 
genuine success in the domestic arena: its 
corporations testified acknowledgeable 
performance in maintaining a decisive say 
in planning the utilization of the collective 
funds with a steadily increasing share of 
business up until now.9 
7 In the old days, such a jointing obviously did not cause any serious deficiencies: after all, both the public 
sphere and the limited market of the second economy were under the strict control of the omnipotent party-sta-
te. However, the interlocking has long survived the old system: during the past decade and a half, it has proven 
strong enough to divert any attempts at separation.
8 Strangely enough, the earlier outlined liberal drives – though in full contradiction to their ideological fo-
undation – have been of great assistance to smoothly reproduce the blurring. Later I will return to the forces that 
oddly create a high degree of concordance between corporatism and liberalism on the Hungarian stage.
9 By the very nature of the process, it is extremely difficult to measure the exact magnitude of the yearly 
amounts diverted from the state’s revenue to private business. However, a number of case-studies among small 
and grand entrepreneurs, and further, the scattered data in the yearly reports of the biggest business chambers, 
the State Privatization Agency, the Ministry of Finance, etc. provide enough evidence to estimate that direct 
state support to private business makes up at least some  6-7 per cent of Hungary’s yearly GDP. This is a truly 
substantial portion, no less than 2.0-2.5 percent higher than the yearly share of the entirety of the public health 
care sector (Voszka, 2003.; Laki, 2003.; Laki  and Szalai, 2004.). 
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At the same time, the need for the fi-
nancial presence of the state has been kept 
alive by the fact that economic restructuring 
has induced erosion even in those market 
relations that had hitherto been regarded as 
more or less stable and “everlasting”. The 
privatization of the state firms has disrupted 
the state orders thought to be secure, while 
the collapse of the traditional eastern mar-
kets and the rather difficult access to the 
western ones in substitution have confused 
and endangered the established export re-
lations. Furthermore, the intense inflow of 
foreign capital and consumer products has 
also resulted in heated competition on the 
fronts of domestic sale. All this has greatly 
increased the risk of full independence and 
invoked for a strengthened buffer role of 
the state.
However, the causes for claiming the 
state’s long-term protection for establish-
ing independence from it include not only 
direct economic components, but also cul-
tural and attitude factors. Above all, it is 
worth mentioning the apparently lasting 
boomerang effect that has accompanied lib-
eration from the political power of the state. 
Paradoxically, the decades of resistance to 
the state as the oppressor have been quite 
clearly being reversed, and while the vari-
ous corporate bodies and interest alliances 
only clung to the state distribution policy 
out of fear and defencelessness, now they 
make angry claims on it. Behind the oppos-
ing principles of privatization intended to 
“regulate” the plundering of public assets, 
intensely competing demands for com-
pensation can be detected. Widely varying 
groups consider that the time has come for 
“the” state to compensate them for their his-
torical grievances and their decades of “lag-
ging behind”, to give them open assistance 
for the advancement they “deserve”, but 
have never achieved – and they do not cease 
to outbid each other in submitting various 
claims for compensation that are “legiti-
mate” when considered separately. Having 
the arguments that justify these claims ac-
cepted and embodied in the legislation and, 
consequently, in the annual plans for cen-
tral financing, is a question of rude political 
force: in this way, the access to the public 
funds has mostly been the direct function of 
the latent bargaining positions established 
prior to the systemic change. However, the 
costs involved are not only those paid to the 
claimants. One also has to take into account 
the indirect ones. The most important are 
the costs of the bureaucratic staff that is 
urgently needed to manage and administer 
the steadily spreading exemptions and the 
adjoining growing funds. Due to the simple 
technical associations involved, the number 
of full-time employees in public admin-
istration has increased by no less than 25 
percent between 1992 and 2002, while em-
ployment in the overall economy has suf-
fered 3 percent shrinkage in the meantime 
(Laky, 2004.).
In this sense, one can definitely say that 
the program of slimming the state down has 
so far led to its actual fattening up. How-
ever, this irony of history has rather seri-
ous financial implications: the portion spent 
by the central state for financing itself has 
grown from 30 percent to 44 per cent of the 
central budgets of the respective years of 
1996 and 2003.10 
Some other arenas of social life throw an 
even clearer light on the indicated ambiva-
lences towards the state. The large number 
of civil societies, associations and founda-
10 Own calculations. Source: www.fn.hu/index. (In the computation, it is only the centrally run units of pu-
blic administration and services that I took into account as those financed directly from the central state budget. 
In other words, the two large spheres of public health care and education were not included, as 85-90 percent 
of their organizations are under the authority of local governance.)
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tions that have been set up amidst the new 
democratic conditions are model cases of 
the simultaneous demand for self-organi-
zation and for bureaucratic recognition.11 
On the one hand, they have gained a vital 
role in providing a wide range of services, 
especially in those areas where public pro-
visions had been non-existent for decades 
(e.g. re-training programs, home-care for 
the sick, alternative medicine, business 
consulting, etc.). On the other hand, they 
have capitalized on their very indispensa-
bility and claimed ample funding from the 
agent whom they substituted: the state. In 
this duality, they have been uninterruptedly 
and faithfully continuing the traditions of 
the second economy – though now within 
institutionalized frames – which demanded, 
as said, undisturbed autonomy in defining 
the terms, and support from above for com-
ing up them. As to the size of the slice that 
this way the corporations embodying “civil 
interests” can cut these days from the col-
lective cake, a few statistical figures signal 
rather remarkable success. In the year 2000, 
the provisions they received in the form of 
direct state subsidies mounted to no less 
than 3.5 percent of the central budget, and 
this amount made up no less than 28.4 per-
cent of their total revenue. In other words, 
within a short decade, the historically new 
civil sector has been heavily geared into the 
state, and the bondage has become so strong 
that any political attempts at cutting it back 
would imply the risk of the immediate col-
lapsing of the entire sector.12
The situation is similar in the collectiv-
ised acquisition and regulation of personal 
income. Enterprise managers and trade 
union activists are unanimous in protest-
ing against all forms of central restriction 
of wage bargaining (interpreting even the 
attempt to reach uniform agreements as a 
sign of central intervention into what is by 
now private production). At the same time 
and with the same momentum, they also 
heavily rely on the very same central state. 
They all use the old paths that have proven 
successful in obtaining individual treat-
ment to win compensation from various 
bodies of the central administration, either 
because of the worsening market conditions 
due to sharpened foreign competition (e.g. 
the domestic pharmaceutical firms), or for 
the acknowledgment of the incomparable 
importance of the service they provide (e.g. 
recurrently claiming a centrally funded 
rise in salaries for teachers, health-work-
ers, etc.), or for the extra costs due to the 
boosting prices on the world market (e.g. 
the Hungarian AA Community arguing 
on behalf of the “car-users’ collective” to 
claim state protection against the losses due 
to the rapidly rising price of oil), etc. – the 
list can be continued endlessly. Again, the 
claims taken piece-by-piece hardly can be 
labelled as “unfounded”. Nevertheless, to-
gether they end up in continuously tapping 
the public resources, and by doing so they 
contribute to the very reproduction of all 
the persistent insecurities, imbalances, and 
ambivalences discussed so far. 
11 Prior to 1989, any grass-roots attempts at founding even a most innocent civil organization (say, for 
providing home-care for the elderly in the village) were perceived (and prosecuted) as dissident political acts. 
Hence, NGOs were practically non-existent, and the “civil sphere” was largely made up from a few thousand 
local sports-associations . With the systemic turn, the situation quickly changed. Within a decade, the number 
of the registered foundations grew from 400 to nearly 20 000, and those of the associations from 8 400 to 28 
400 (Non-profit szervezetek Magyarországon..., 2002.).
12 Own calculations, based on the national account and on the data in Non-profit szektor...– It is worth adding 
that the state’s contribution proves exceptionally high in light of the respective indices of the productive sector. 
The contributions, subsidies and supports received from this latter segment of the economy, together with the 
gains made from the NGOs’ own business make up 22.8 percent of the yearly civil budget which is – as seen 
– substantially less than what comes through public channels.  
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To sum up, the inseparability of the 
state and the market, and together with it, 
the tight interlocking of the public and pri-
vate spheres and resources of living seem 
profoundly ingrained in the post-commu-
nist Hungarian society and economy. As 
shown above, despite all the strong motives 
for full-fledged independence, the majority 
has serious reasons and deep-rooted inter-
ests in maintaining the bond – even though 
the overall costs have been skyrocketing. 
Though attempts at assessing the exact 
magnitude of the involved public funds 
are complicated by the very nature of the 
game that works against transparency, one 
can still come up with some informed ap-
proximation. By adding up the bits quoted 
earlier, and also taking into account also dy-
namic implications13, we are probably rath-
er close to reality with estimating that no 
less than some 38-45 percent of the yearly 
central revenue is spent on assisting pri-
vate business and market activities through 
a great variety of support schemes14 that are 
financed directly from public resources.15 
While this magnitude seems shocking, 
still the biggest price to be paid cannot be 
expressed in currency – for the structural 
traps have evolved. The interlocking has 
grown self-sustaining, and neither of the 
parties can break out of it. A parliamentary 
state has rather limited means for interven-
ing. Instead, its role remains to maneuver 
amid the conditions of heated inflation16 
and spiralling indebtedness17 that have been 
kept in coincidental motion by the endless 
bargaining mechanisms. Here and there, the 
new legislation tries to set the limit for one 
group or the other – but the next time the 
boomerang certainly kicks back. 
There is only one arena where the door 
still seems to be open for repeated cuts: this 
is the domain of the welfare for the poor. 
Here the state can rely on a vast political 
consensus. All its efforts to apply extra 
strict rules without concessions are met by 
massive approval on the side of the ma-
jority, all the more so, because the matter 
itself appears rather debatable. After all, it 
is a widely shared and historically founded 
view among the non-poor that the poor have 
their own lot in their situation. 
The antecedents of this widespread con-
viction date back to the years of late social-
ism, when poverty in the material sense 
was largely bound to non-participation in 
the nationwide movement of informal pro-
duction (Szalai, 1997.). By not having any 
13 It is important to emphasize that the involved funds largely follow a one-way route, and are transferred 
to the recipients without even the hope of later return to the state’s revenue. This strange situation is partly due 
to the wide range of  tax-exemptions, wavers, and similar favors that the respective regulations imply, and is 
partly a consquence of the widespread practice of tax-evasion. In sum, it is not only the size, but – probably 
more importantly – the essence of the relationship which makes the Hungarian case profoundly different from 
state support to private business in the West.
14 Just to list a few, these forms include the various sectoral subsidies, special public support-schemes to 
certain projects executed by private business, tax allowences and –refunds, publicly funded compensation-sche-
mes, etc. and the adjoining costs of management and administration.
15  The overall amount is really extraordinary: it comes up to 13-15 percent of the annual GDP, meaning in 
other words that the yearly public support drawn into private business exceeds the state’s total expenditure on 
public healthcare and education by some 44-67 percent!     
16 Between 1990 and 2000, consumer prices rose by a yearly average rate of 14-35 percent. For the past ye-
ars, inflation has been on the decrease though its rate was still above 6 percent in 2004. (Source: www.fn.hu)
17 Taking the year of 1999 as an example, the total of foreign and domestic indebtedness of the state’s re-
venue amounted to 61 percent of the GDP. With this extremely high ratio, Hungary is far above the respective 
proportions of the seven other postcommunist countries that joined the EU in 2004. (In comparison, the index 
for the same year was 43 p.c. in Poland – granting her the second position in the row –, 28 p.c. in Slovakia and 
as low as 15 percent in the Czech Republic (Antal, 2004.).
320
Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...
extra resources from private endeavours, 
the poor of the 1980s became the primary 
victims of the above-outlined erosion of so-
cial security and welfare. Furthermore, they 
had nobody else to blame but themselves: 
amid the dramatically atomised conditions 
of self-protection through the second econ-
omy involvement, it seemed their choice to 
keep away. The collapse of the old regime 
did not induce any substantial change in 
this appearance, particularly because the 
majority of today’s chronically poor came 
from families of the one-time outsiders of 
the informal sector, whose marginalization, 
in turn, could be traced back well into the 
decades of early state-socialism and before 
(Horváth, 1996.). However, for varied po-
litical reasons and a range of counteract-
ing interests, the unbroken reproduction 
of their deprived situation has not been 
revealed until today. Hence, the public has 
little cause to revise its strong belief that 
it is primarily themselves whom the poor 
should charge for the unchanged state of 
their destitution.
The belief has massively resisted all the 
dramatic changes around. Neither the col-
lective experience of deep economic crisis, 
nor the unbrokenly continued impoverish-
ment of the poorest, despite the upward turn 
in the country’s economic performance, 
rendered sufficiently strong evidence to 
falsify it. Thus, the broadly echoed personi-
fied arguments are still dominant: the poor 
are poor because they behave differently, 
they are somehow not like “us”.
True, in contrast with the majority, the 
poor still have at best very limited access to 
the market: they are too young or too old, 
uneducated, the Roma, in bad health, or ge-
ographically badly placed and so on to find 
employment, or they have lost it long ago. 
It is also true that in the absence of earn-
ings and market-related gains, the low in-
comes their households rely on are derived 
almost solely from the “official” sources 
(public pensions, state-financed benefits, 
unemployment benefits, local welfare as-
sistance etc.), which gives the appearance 
that the “public” is supporting them. The 
uniformity of their daily sources thus cre-
ates the false impression that in reality it is 
they who “use up” the thin trickle of already 
dwindling public sources. The majority 
are therefore in full agreement on continu-
ously reducing the scope of their support: 
all initiatives for reducing “squandering” in 
this domain are given the green light. The 
liberal principles of economizing are more 
than welcome here. 
Let me discuss now, how they are put 
into motion in the daily operation of the 
second sub-system, i.e. in the welfare as-
sistance “just for the needy”.
THE SECOND SUB-SYSTEM: 
THE GHETTO OF POVERTY 
WITH THICKENING WALLS
As outlined above, the creation of a 
publicly funded separate sub-system for 
providing efficient and just welfare exclu-
sively for those in need was an inherent part 
of the liberal welfare reforms of the 1990s. 
While the primary goal certainly was to 
contribute this way to the desired diminu-
tion of the state, some further important 
considerations were also involved. 
First of all, it was widely believed that 
poverty would automatically wither away 
with the economic recovery. The arguments 
were in line with the reigning doctrines in 
policy-making: amidst the conditions of 
continuous growth and the concomitant 
expansion of the labour market, the unem-
ployed would become re-employed, run-
down factories would be replaced by well-
paying business, household incomes would 
rise, contribution-driven benefits for those 
out of work would increase, etc. In short, 
together with the elimination of its causes, 
poverty would shrink to a residual size and 
if at all, it would hit people only tempo-
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rarily. Secondly, it was also believed that 
improved targeting and the local schemes 
built on the community’s consensus would 
ultimately conclude in generous supports 
sufficient to help the poor to overcome 
their destitute state. Thirdly, by swiftly de-
centralizing a great number of former cen-
trally administered schemes and provisions, 
poverty alleviation was also to be assisted 
also from another aspect. It was assumed 
that through empowering the local govern-
ments, the key decisions on people’s daily 
living would arise from insightful knowl-
edge and personal acquaintance and thereby 
fairness, flexibility and accuracy would be 
raised at once.
However, history has nullified all these 
expectations. As amply demonstrated by a 
number of independently run studies that 
have repeatedly arrived at the same conclu-
sion (Spéder, 2002.; Havasi, 2002.; Szalai, 
2002.; Bass et al., 2003.; Szívós and Tóth, 
2004.), despite all the modifications to the 
support system, all the technical refine-
ments in its regulation, and all the voca-
tional training of those dealing with the 
matter, there has not been even the slight-
est reduction in the degree of poverty in 
Hungary and social exclusion has even in-
creased. Welfare assistance has obviously 
done little to help the poor. The question 
therefore arises: what have been the rea-
sons behind that? 
The answer can be given just partially 
by looking solely at the working of the sys-
tem of local welfare assistance. As to its 
principles and constituents, the scheme is 
certainly neither better nor worse in Hunga-
ry than similar arrangements are anywhere 
else. After all, means-testing, disciplining 
in order to teach the client to economize bet-
ter and to be more diligent, providing tight 
supervision over all the miniscule deeds of 
the daily life of the poor, etc. are built-in 
components of such designs everywhere. 
Hence, they all carry the more or less uni-
form momentum of humiliation and the 
concomitant stabilizing of defencelessness 
with little personal energy left for those as-
sisted to break out of the state of constant 
destitution.18 This said, one can then con-
clude that it is probably more the implied 
additional social, economic and political 
functions of welfare assistance within the 
entirety of the system of social protection 
that qualify it than any particular internal 
characteristics of the scheme as such.
When applying this broader approach, it 
is justified to say that Hungary’s decentral-
ized assistance scheme has met the expecta-
tion of its designers: its primary achievement 
has indeed been to carry out the purposeful 
transformation of the earlier all-embrac-
ing central state redistribution.19 Together 
with this, the scheme has accomplished a 
perhaps even more important mission: the 
canalization of an important part of the af-
fected social groups into a sealed sub-divi-
sion of provisions. True, without the great 
expansion of welfare assistance as a new, 
dynamic branch of the economy it would 
hardly have been possible to break up the 
former oversized system: while “guiding” 
large strata into the market-regulated field 
of provisions, it was profoundly needed to 
“evict” other large groups from the potential 
use of central funds – and the local schemes 
reacted on this call with great perfection. 
18 Since the birth of Richard Titmuss’ classical essay on the subject  (1958.), a vast literature has repeatedly 
demonstrated these practically unalterable implications of means-testing.
19 A few figures indicate the scale of  the change. Within the total of welfare transfers from public funds 
(comprising payments in social security, centrally distributed benefits and local  assistance), the ratio of  provi-
sions from the central budget dropped from 24 to 8 percent between 1991 and 2001, while the respective pro-
portion of local welfare provisions rose from 5 to 10 percent in the meantime. (Own calculations based on data 
in the Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2001 (CSO, 2002.).
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The involved change of place not only 
required the application of financial tech-
niques for regrouping, but it also opened 
the way for important mobility processes. 
Another important function of the rapidly 
growing welfare assistance system was 
that, by creating thousands of new offices 
and tens of thousands of labour market 
jobs with decent middle-class positions, it 
created a refuge for many who had been in 
danger of losing employment amidst eco-
nomic restructuring.20 
An examination of local supports in 
their natural community context reveals 
further important functions beyond these 
macro-level roles. After all, the scheme 
turned out to be very helpful in creating so-
cial peace and smoothly operating relations 
in the life of local communities. Firstly, 
it has provided a professional machinery 
and institutional background enabling the 
non-poor majority to deal with poverty as 
a minority problem separated from its own 
“normal” affairs; secondly, the system has 
offered efficient instruments for managing 
the fluctuation of the local labour markets; 
thirdly, it has rendered reliable guaran-
tees for the endured supply of the human 
resources for the least qualified and least 
desired jobs. 
In addition, the scheme of decentralized 
means-tested provisions in substitution of 
the earlier centralized arrangements has 
been of great assistance in maintaining the 
impression that the “anomalies” in making 
justified distinctions among the poor for ac-
knowledgeable entitlement were only inci-
dental: they certainly could be eliminated 
by better and more precise local regulations, 
by better training of the providers and by 
refining the behaviour of the needy, espe-
cially their attitude to work. Moreover, this 
fragmentation has successfully hid the real 
selective functions of the system behind 
its welcome veil: the potential question of 
social responsibility for poverty has been 
almost automatically reduced to the ques-
tion of improving the level of expertise of 
a few local welfare workers, a routine prob-
lem that could and should be handled within 
the walls of the local authority.
It is important to stress that while ex-
ercising the economic and political func-
tions listed here – which at first sight ap-
pear foreign to the spirit of assistance – the 
considerations of fairness and neediness 
mentioned above lose nothing of their sig-
nificance. Quite the contrary: the providers 
are not being misleading when constantly 
affirming that their work is guided primarily 
by these very considerations. However, by 
transforming the principles into hundreds 
of thousands of decisions on particular 
cases, they are continuously doing a deli-
cate “translation” work in order to justify 
nothing but selection. In the final analysis, 
it is thus the legitimization of the prevail-
ing deep social divides which is assigned 
20 A few figures are sufficient to illustrate the process. First and foremost the figures for higher education bear 
witness to explosive growth. While in the 1990./91 academic year 1 600 students were enrolled in the various 
forms of social training offered at the country’s universities and colleges (social work, social pedagogy, later 
child welfare service activity, Jewish community work), by 2002/03 their total number had risen to 11 000. In 
the meantime there had also been a dynamic expansion in the scope and number of institutions. For example, 
figures published on care for the homeless show that the number of daytime warming rooms increased from 14 
in 1993 to 71 in 2001, and the number of soup kitchens rose from 27 to 43; over the same period the number of 
residential institutions providing temporary care grew from 255 to 344 and the numbers they employed increa-
sed from 12 000 to 20 000. Only a relatively short time series is available on family helpers due to the repeated 
reorganisation of the services. But the trend is similar: between 1998 and 2001 their number increased by exactly 
300 units (from 462 to 766). Finally, the annual figures on the non-profit sector also indicate substantial expan-
sion: between 1993 and 2002 the number of foundations and associations serving social purposes increased by 
around 1 300, from 2 759 to 4 008 (Source of the data: the annual statistical reports for the different areas.). 
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to them as their chief role in the broad di-
vision of labour. This fundamental trait of 
the assistance scheme is inescapable. By 
making distinctions between the needy 
and those who are not entitled to support, 
by always giving rationalization for this 
distinction, and by channelling the clearly 
separated groups of clients into different 
benefits (or treatment) paths, the local wel-
fare distributors are actually rendering an 
official basis sanctified by the decision of 
an authority for the acceptance of hard so-
cial and labour market selection, and more 
generally, for the unquestionable confirma-
tion of the institutionalised procedure of 
discrimination. 
In this order the keyword is distinc-
tion, which, at the same time, has its clear 
indication: as said, it is the level of need. 
However, the level of need is not self-evi-
dent; it is surely not identical with income. 
For no just categorizations can be done ex-
clusively on weighing up one’s resources. 
After all, one knows from the daily experi-
ence what a huge difference can occur be-
tween two households living on the same 
amounts. One is thoroughly economizing, 
the other is happy-go-lucky, one spares on 
heating, the other throws away money on 
alcohol, etc. Hence, in order to make jus-
tice in selecting the “truly” needy and also 
to keep order and justice, some additional 
characteristics are needed – otherwise the 
idea fails in its entirety. 
Hungary’s invention is easy to guess: it 
is the centuries-old idea of deservingness. 
Deservingness as the principle of a “just” 
selection has proven remarkably effective: 
with the purposeful application of the con-
cept, local governments achieved the im-
pressive result of cutting back the take-up 
rates of public assistance by no less than 
65 per cent! (Ferge, 2000.; Havasi, 2002.; 
Bass et al., 2003.; Szívós and Tóth, 2004.) 
As recent surveys have unequivocally 
shown, only a relatively narrow circle of 
the needy can be sure that once the welfare 
office has accepted them, they can count on 
its unconditional support. This is the circle 
of the faultless poor: elderly people with 
low pensions who keep their homes tidy 
and pay their bills in time, divorced women 
with low earnings whose children are neat 
and attend the school regularly, miners and 
factory workers whose financial situation, 
as well as their health, has been undermined 
by long illness, crafted skilled workers who 
lost their jobs when the local factory shut 
down and whose poverty, regarded as a 
misfortune, renders the ideal case to dem-
onstrate what local welfare offices mean by 
“persons in trouble through no fault of their 
own”, etc. In these examples, it is beyond 
question that the cause of financial decline 
lies in the circumstances, for which at the 
most those affected deserve understanding 
and solidarity. 
However, the majority of the poor who 
apply for assistance do not belong to this 
group. The local office workers – like the 
widest circles of public opinion standing 
behind them – share the already outlined 
strong view that is little subject to appeal 
on the situation and their own contribution 
to it. Expressed in its daily wording: “It 
is extremely rare that people are not at all 
responsible for their own poverty and they 
can certainly be expected to make at least 
some attempts to get out of it. Of course, the 
extent to which people are their own worst 
enemies differs from case to case.” On the 
basis of such a widely held conviction, no-
body would then question the rightfulness, 
and indeed the necessity, of taking into ac-
count the degree of the applicant’s “faults”, 
“errors”, “failures” and “irresponsibility” 
in judging applications for welfare assist-
ance to be given from nowhere else but the 
taxpayers’ money. Hence, it is the primary 
duty of those assigned to spend this money 
to scrutinize each case in detail and decline 
all the claims that prove unjustified. 
The errors, shortcomings and irrespon-
sibility that can be listed as a basis when 
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making a decision come in many different 
forms, but there are two particularly seri-
ous cases of people’s “own fault”. One is 
“irresponsibility” shown in having children 
– because even if there is little money, the 
family can still live on it with good and far-
sighted family planning. And the other is a 
“failed” attitude to work – for people can 
always do work of some kind if they really 
want to. A vast body of literature produced 
to refute them has still not managed to top-
ple these two related dogmas. 
It is perhaps hardly necessary to argue at 
length that the main force that keeps them 
alive is their clear ethnic/racial content, 
giving the local communities a handy con-
firmation for the conflict that causes the 
most tension in their everyday lives: the 
feelings of the non-Roma majority who suf-
fered relative losses or at least have lived 
in a state of constant insecurity amidst the 
lengthy process of economic transforma-
tion, towards the Roma minority living in 
extreme and lasting poverty. Furthermore, 
the implied ethnic/racial differentiation 
also entails some beneficial outcome in 
the economic sense: it helps to keep claims 
for local assistance within limits. After all, 
amidst the arising competition and, in fact, 
heated rivalry between the Roma and non-
Roma groups among the “truly” needy, it 
is always the “others” whom to blame for 
“eating up” the scarce local funds and for 
lowering the actually delivered sums while 
winding up the rates of refusal.
Of course, in demanding that the men-
tioned cases of “own fault” be carefully 
screened out, no one states (openly) that 
“we are talking here mainly about the Roma 
(and the lumpen poor who have become like 
them”). But even so, everyone understands 
what is implied. And the practice of wel-
fare assistance converts this widely inferred 
thought into money, while at the same time 
it also transforms the personified struggles 
of openly racialized pre-selection into the 
rule-governed cooperation of the office and 
its clients under the guidance of covertly 
racialized rules. 
A recent survey on local welfare alloca-
tion reveals the hidden, but efficacious ra-
cial content of this second – rule-governed 
– stage, tailored exclusively for those who 
passed the first grade of pre-selection for 
establishing their “deservingness”.21 The 
final result of the analysis can be summed 
up in a few short sentences. The data show 
in the first place that the more the children, 
the higher is the risk to become rejected. 
Furthermore, if being accepted, the sum 
ultimately awarded in welfare assistance is 
in inverse proportion to the degree of pover-
ty – the larger the family, the smaller the 
aid granted to assist them. Additionally, it 
is clear from the findings that these associa-
tions apply only to the Roma families. 
But before attributing the matter to the 
prejudices of the distributors of welfare 
assistance, it is worth to look at the regu-
lations. Then it becomes clear that if the 
local authorities do give support to assist 
families with children, calculated per child 
they give slightly more aid to large families 
– both the Roma and non-Roma. However, 
poor Roma families usually comprise not 
only more children, but also more adults 
than it can be found in the respective non-
Roma cases.22 Nonetheless, overcrowd-
ing is not a criterion for entitlement in the 
prevailing regulations. It therefore follows 
logically that the office recognizes needi-
ness to a lesser extent precisely in those 
21 The survey comprised detailed data of the welfare allocating practices of 30 local governments in the 
years 2000. and 2003. (Neményi and Szalai, 2005.). 
22 Of course, this is not because of their “cultural otherness” but in the result of their greater poverty: with 
poorer housing, more sick family members in need of nursing, and less money, the only rational decision the 
Roma kin can make is to move under a common roof.
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occurrences where there are most people: 
when it assists the Roma families.
The differences in the provided sums 
are rather small. Nevertheless, the sym-
bolic value is rather substantial: after all, it 
is the very act of differentiating that re-
ally matters here. And by building it into 
the regulations (whether on purpose or out 
of certain blindness to social reality), the 
welcome messages are clear. The commu-
nity in a constant battle with the Roma can 
be assured that “its” poor receive slightly 
more than those of the minority; the sup-
ported numbersome families among the 
non-Roma can gain some self-respect in 
comparing themselves to the Roma; the as-
sisted Roma poor enjoy a similar advantage 
with a glimpse at their rejected neighbours, 
and above all, the earlier indicated rivalry 
as an efficient self-regulatory instrument 
to keep welfare claims within strict limits 
remains in motion. 
The situation is more complex for the 
second qualified case of “own fault” – a 
“failed attitude” to work. Because in this 
domain applications for welfare assistance 
can be rejected on two grounds: if the ap-
plicant works, and if s/he does not. In the 
first case, because the work is being done 
“not in the right place” and “not legally” 
– in plain words, the income is earned ille-
gally. In the second case, because although 
it is rightfully expected, s/he still does not 
take a job, or is “choosy” about accepting 
the (public) work intended solely for wel-
fare applicants.
Let me show in some details how these 
considerations are applied in the daily prac-
tice of assistance.
The welfare office has many problems 
with the unregistered work. Firstly, it gener-
ates income for which the person concerned 
cannot be required to provide evidence, 
even though it is perfectly obvious that 
the family is not as poor as it claims to be. 
Secondly, and closely related to this: the 
unregistered work casts a shadow on the re-
lationship of trust, the welfare provider who 
has been “tricked” cannot do anything, even 
though they would help anyway. The only 
possibility left to them is exposure. They 
must order an unannounced investigation 
to display the abuse, using the full weight 
of their official powers to put a timely stop 
to this unlawful receipt of assistance (and 
safeguard their job in the eyes of her su-
pervisors). Thirdly, unregistered work is 
by nature fluctuating: sometimes it can be 
found continuously, at other times not, and 
at such times the client genuinely does not 
have anything to live on. In such a situa-
tion s/he really would be entitled to support, 
but the offices are not able to follow such 
fluctuation. Unpredictability, aggravated 
by the undermined trust result in constant 
sharp conflicts and provide everyday con-
firmation of the view that “these Gypsies” 
– because who else would they be?! – are 
impossible to deal with. If they were to fi-
nally work “properly”, everything would 
be different.
For all these reasons, there are many 
problems with them. But they at least work. 
And even if this fact cannot be recognized 
with welfare assistance, the office utters a 
few words of understanding for their efforts 
between two personal fights. 
But there is a group of “own fault” ap-
plicants who do not deserve even these few 
good words. They are the ones who “just 
look out for where they can get welfare as-
sistance instead of going out and looking 
for work”. There would be plenty of work 
for them – true, all are rather demanding 
and poorly paid. But the Roma “resist” if 
the office offers this kind of work with good 
intentions. This is the way they are “social-
ized”– as the welfare workers often put it 
for explanation.
It is easy to see that, regardless of their 
personal attitudes, the staff of the local wel-
fare offices simply have no means at their 
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disposal to properly react to the present la-
bour market position of those many appli-
cants – for the most part Roma – who were 
thrown out of regular employment 10–15 
years ago, and since then have been able to 
find casual, unregistered black work at best. 
From their viewpoint, this labour market 
situation does not exist. In response they 
can do two things. Either they try to force 
the clients into “proper” jobs, and in so do-
ing they continue the legacy of the former 
state-socialist police, that is, they regard 
their official task as being principally the 
prosecution of crime; or they acknowledge 
the reality and become silent accomplices 
to the clients who have been pushed off the 
margin, in which case they risk their own 
positions. Either way, a continuous conflict 
is unavoidable. 
It is this that gives the dynamics of one 
of the main roles of the welfare offices in 
today’s Hungary: meeting the local demand 
for the worst jobs and providing an outlet 
for labour market fluctuations. Because if 
the environment is more tolerant and the su-
periors and the opinion-setting strata of the 
community are ready to turn a blind eye23, 
the welfare office reacts like a seismograph 
and looks the other way: within the limited 
frames set, it generously renders assistance. 
And the reverse is also true: if landscaping 
needs to be done in public areas but the 
funds are lacking, if the residents are com-
plaining that the streets are dirty and “it is 
time the mayor did something”, if an army 
of auditors descends to check the accounts 
of the indebted local authority, then only 
those who are prepared to do the work the 
office allots them can expect to receive sup-
port. And the main task of welfare work-
ers is to make their clients understand that 
compliance is their only option.
The survey data show that Roma – and 
the very poorest non-Roma sharing a simi-
lar fate – came to see this long ago. It was 
the pressure of a number of daily facts that 
taught them. The first among them is the ex-
treme segmentation of the Hungarian labour 
market dating back to the very origins of the 
post-1990 economic transformation (Ker-
tesi, 2000; Kemény, 2000.; Fazekas, 2001.; 
Köllő, 2001.). As a result of the gradually 
intensifying segmentation, the poorest stra-
ta of workers (with a heavy overrepresen-
tation of the Roma among them) are now 
almost entirely excluded from any access to 
proper jobs. Of course, their exclusion did 
not begin today, but it became practically 
complete by the years after the millennium 
(Lukács, 2005.). The second set of lessons 
that the poor – especially the Roma poor 
– had to learn was that the marketization 
from below led to an unprecedented com-
petition among those inside employment 
to capitalize on all the good jobs that today 
arise from the old informal production.24 In 
this process of marketization from below, 
the access to work is still at the most only 
partly regulated by the demand and sup-
ply, and is largely a question of trust and 
connections where the former relations of 
mutual favours play the main role in the 
distribution of the considerably reduced 
number of jobs.25 The poor generally did 
23 Local opinion-leaders and respected members of the community have good reasons to be blind from time 
to time. After all, as participants of the earlier described under-funded vast Hungarian embourgeoisement pro-
cess, they are compelled to economize with the resources in all the imaginable forms. Cheap or unpaid labor of 
the most defenseless welfare recipients is one the forms where the cost/benefit ratio is truly minimal (The harm 
made to human rights and dignity are rarely considered, the least when the laborers are Roma.).
24 This phenomenon is basically the result of the gradual “merger” of the once existent first and second 
economies (Laky, 1995.).
25 The process and some of its consequences for the social division of work today are very clearly reflected 
in the data series of the CSO for 1986 and the national representative time budget survey of the year 2000 do-
cumenting work done in the formal and informal economy (Vági, 2002.).
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not have and still do not have anything 
to offer in exchange, and so the well-paid 
contracts, commissioned work, consulting 
projects, etc. remain beyond their reach. 
And even if they have the necessary train-
ing and experience, they have little hope of 
being the ones to learn in time about any 
opportunities that exist. 
In sum, in Hungary today well-paid, 
protected and secure jobs are open only to 
those who already have such jobs, while 
those who for one reason or another never 
entered this circle or were forced out it 
are denied the access to work. The poor, 
especially the Roma poor, are shockingly 
underrepresented in the first group, while 
dramatically over represented in the second. 
The cultural arguments that owe the lack of 
employment to “bad” socialization and the 
subsequent “faulty” attitudes to work have 
to be considered against the brutal facts of 
sharp segmentation and dramatic exclusion 
that are further accentuated by a set of eth-
nic/racial implications. 
Under such circumstances, it is taken for 
granted that if on rare occasions the possi-
bility for even the worst kind of paid work 
arises, it is a must for the poor to accept it 
without hesitation or bargaining. They have 
no other concerns but immediately grabbing 
it even if the resulting earnings are so small 
that, adding up all what the members of the 
family pool from payments for casual work, 
the resulting monthly income of the house-
hold does not amount to more than three-
quarters of the minimum monthly wage of 
a single employee in the legal economy. 
Moreover, being selected amidst the other-
wise hopeless state of uninterrupted desti-
tution is a treasure and the poor repay it by 
exploiting themselves to the maximum. As 
survey data show, when the poorest people 
obtain work they outdo everyone in their 
efforts, clearly refuting the widely held 
opinion that they are shirkers.26 
These and similar facts should make it 
clear that whether the poor have their hands 
full with work or not does not depend on 
their attitude. It is the reality though, that 
their efforts remain largely invisible: to 
themselves because of the very small pay-
ment they receive for the extreme exploi-
tation, and to the outside world because no 
written contract was made to set its terms, 
no records were taken of its details, and 
further, because neither them, nor the em-
ployees paid any taxes or social security 
contributions on it. On top of the involved 
obvious defencelessness, it is a most tragic 
irony that, amid the indicated conditions, 
such a traceless existence is in the own 
best interest of the poor themselves. The 
situation is clear: if they do not have even 
a chance of a proper occupation, then they 
should at least be allowed a livelihood; and 
for this they have to apply for welfare as-
sistance which the office would refuse to 
give them if it knew about their “illegal” 
incomes from work. At the same time, these 
incomes from work are so little that they 
make no real difference, even to the lives of 
the poorest of the poor. Under such circum-
stances, welfare assistance is quite literally 
needed for mere survival – obtaining it is of 
vital importance. And in the same way, it 
is a vital question on which the sharp-eyed 
welfare providers should be reassured: the 
concealment of the casual work that now 
and then turns up is in the common interest 
of the office and the client. 
26 Further proof of this fact is provided by the findings of the already mentioned national time budget sur-
vey made by the Central Statistical Office in the year 2000. The processing of close to 11 000 time use diaries 
found that although the “poor falling behind” have barely over half the chance of doing paid work compared to 
the average for the adult population aged 15 to 79, the intensity of their work exceeds the average. The length 
of working time calculated for the number of persons actually working on a given day of the year is no less than 
23 percent longer for those in the poorest group of society than the national average (Szalai and Vági, 2002.). 
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These common interests therefore gua-
rantee two things. On the one hand, they 
secure that unregistered employment en-
shrouded by the working of local welfare 
assistance continues to flourish unchanged 
and as needed; on the other hand they pow-
erfully safeguard that the bargain to be 
struck between the provider and the client 
remains a matter of internal struggles be-
tween the rather defenceless office work-
ers in service of the public will and the ex-
tremely defenceless poor – above all: the 
Roma poor – in service of demonstrating 
general “justice” and wise economizing 
with the public funds.
In this way, the ghetto is constructed out 
of common interests. All that remains is to 
safeguard its walls, so that social peace can 
be maintained and the majority can accom-
plish its huge national tasks while enjoying 
the gifts of democracy which – for the (un-
limited) time being – implies only their full 
citizenship. As we have seen, the persistent 
“cultural arguments” about explaining pov-
erty along ethnic/racial lines are of utmost 
importance here: without their powerful 
justification, full citizenship with all what 
it means should embrace all citizens of the 
country, the (Roma) poor included. Howev-
er, as discussed earlier, other tasks seem to 
be ranked higher in the eyes of the Hungar-
ian public at this stage of its lengthy post-
communist transformation. It is enough to 
recall the pressing chores of modernization, 
quick adaptation to the enlarged Europe, 
uplifting of the level of wages to support 
competition on the Western market, etc. In 
this rating, it seems wise and also “evident” 
to put the clearly domestic issue of poverty 
toward the end of the scale. 
However, in a country with a democratic 
constitution and declared citizens’ rights, 
such a differentiation cannot be made in an 
open way. But if put in “cultural” terms, it 
immediately gives reason for an important 
democratic principle: after all, citizenship is 
nothing but a contract between society and 
the individual to meet certain obligations in 
an exchange for certain rights. Those who 
cannot meet the former should not expect 
society to provide the latter. In this vein, 
the earlier outlined liberal considerations on 
the usefulness of a separated sub-system of 
provisions for the needy are completed and, 
at the same time, justified by the notion of 
“cultural otherness”. However, as we have 
seen, their bondage becomes the foundation 
of structural disintegration. After all, the 
coupled principles of unlimited competition 
on the market and expulsion on the grounds 
of individual failure keep alive as a right-
ful order the institutional separation of an 
utterly closed world – a ghetto proper – for 
those whom the concepts imply: Hungary’s 
dramatically marginalized long-term poor 
and, above all, the Roma among them. 
The coexistent two sub-systems of welfare 
– the rather generous public financing of 
the market and the running of the impov-
erished quarters of public provisions for 
those outside of it – reflect and reproduce 
the outlined strange social contract in stead-
fast advancement toward a social structure 
divided along ever sharper fault-lines.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE 
SHAPING OF A FOURTH WORLD 
OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 
Now that the above discussions hope-
fully made the reader acquainted with the 
basic traits of the two sub-systems of wel-
fare provisions in their troubled coexistence 
in contemporary Hungary, it seems inescap-
able to return to the more general questions 
of the introduction and make an attempt to 
properly locate the case on the map of the 
“worlds of welfare capitalism”. 
However, any such endeavours can 
be only tentative at this stage, for at least 
for two reasons. Firstly, the period since 
the collapse of “softened” totalitarianism 
in Hungary has been too short to reliably 
construct the necessary time-series for an 
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informed comparison of the post-commu-
nist welfare state with its established West-
ern counterpart. Secondly, due to the very 
nature of the systemic transformation that 
was aimed at turning upside down a range 
of old institutions, rules, and arrangements, 
one would end up with a number of empty 
cells when filling the columns of Esping-
Andersen’s matrices with the respective 
contemporary data for Hungary. 
Let me mention two key examples for 
highlighting the difficulties: full employment 
and the rate of de-commodification in social 
policy – as two essential elements of any of 
the modern welfare regimes. Taken in simple 
numerical values, one can establish that, as to 
the old party-state, both of these constituents 
had scored high, and they both seriously fell 
upon its collapse. Nevertheless, when con-
sidering also the actual content behind the 
measures, the one-time high ranking proves 
nothing but an artefact. For it turns out that 
the bare numeric comparison of the old and 
the new regimes actually “rewards” the op-
pression instead of rights, there are dictates 
from above instead of choice, subjugation 
instead of freedom, and forced collectivism 
instead of respected privacy. 
A mere statistical appearance would thus 
be fully misleading; moreover, it would hide 
the actual traits of the old rule instead of 
revealing them. After all, full employment 
and “de-commodification” in social policy 
were the true fundaments of it – however, 
not for benefiting people, but for maintain-
ing the totalitarian regime. It was then not 
incidental, but essential for the changeover 
to deconstruct full employment based 
on coercion and also to liberate choice on 
the market in replacement of the rendering 
of “de-commodified” impoverishment. In 
brief, Hungary – as all other societies for-
merly under Soviet rule – had to start anew. 
In this historic crusade, decomposition and 
construction still go hand in hand, and their 
blend still generates rather fluid conditions, 
blurred institutional arrangements, and un-
clear relations that do not foster any endeav-
ours for classical statistical comparisons.
Despite the barriers that largely hinder 
the collating of the numerical indicators, 
the Hungarian case nonetheless seems to 
carry certain crystallized traits that allow 
us to venture a few conclusions in a com-
parative vein. 
Let me turn to them now.
As this paper intended to demonstrate, in 
contemporary Hungary, neither of the dis-
cussed two sub-systems of welfare seems 
to be of a transient character. Firstly, as we 
saw, their post-communist development 
has strikingly adapted a scope of arrange-
ments and practices earlier of key impor-
tance, though the adaptation has taken place 
amidst the profound re-tailoring of their 
one-time functions and roles. Secondly – 
but certainly not independently – both sub-
systems have been deeply ingrained, as also 
discussed, into the evolving social structure 
of belated embourgeoisement. Moreover, 
they both have strongly assisted in its ad-
vancement and reproduction. Therefore, we 
have good reasons to assume that, despite 
the above-indicated unsettlement as to the 
details and daily routines, the fundamental 
attributes and workings of Hungary’s wel-
fare regime have been firmly drafted and 
will stay like this for quite some time.
This said, let me put my main conclu-
sion: the post-communist welfare state of 
Hungary neither fits any of the “three worlds 
of welfare capitalism”, nor is it implying in-
dications of proceeding toward any of them. 
Instead, Hungary represents a fourth model: 
a mix of corporatism and liberalism, but as 
such, it is a powerful entity.27 
27 It is not Esping-Andersen’s failure but perhaps a trick of history that, at the time of publishing his book, 
it was exactly this mix that the author excluded from the expectable scenarios. He wrote: “The degree to which 
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This is a strong statement. Let me bring 
up some considerations in support of it.
In its mixed quality, the Hungarian 
post-communist welfare state manifests 
the forcefulness of the deep-lying historical 
structures: contemporary developments can 
be considered as the lineal continuations of 
a broken path. As studies in political history 
have convincingly shown, the country’s 
current welfare regime is strongly built 
on those pre-war structures that had been 
“suspended” by the communist experiment, 
but that could then be revitalized due to 
their effective preservation (Szabó, 1995.; 
Tamás, 2002.). After all, the rise of the sec-
ond economy and its gearing into the formal 
world under the party-state’s rule had been 
a prelude to the naked restoration of the 
fragmented institutional bargaining mecha-
nisms upon the systemic turn. In this sense, 
post-communist transformation in Hungary 
is but a return to the country’s temporarily 
frozen trajectory, i.e. to the working of a 
political structure built on strong corpora-
tions (with an etatist blend).28 
Nevertheless, the decades of state-so-
cialism changed the pre-war trends in one 
fundamental aspect. Through forced indus-
trialization, the old agrarian formations were 
broken up once for all, and together with 
this, the vast peasantry living before amidst 
half-feudal conditions became the urban 
working class. As studies in the social his-
tory of the period have amply documented, 
this was a substantial change, concluding, 
for the most part, in genuine upward mobil-
ity (Fokasz and Örkény, 2000.). The pro-
found shift in the social structure also affect-
ed those groups whose integration into the 
established strata of state-socialism was less 
successful: the unqualified rural laborers and 
– above all – the dissolved one-time Roma 
communities. Their fate was to become the 
marginalized, though still involved, prole-
tariat on the fringes of socialist industry and 
society. It was the totalitarian hoop that kept 
them inside, and with its falling apart, it was 
the liberal design of the welfare ghetto that 
came in substitution. After all, the logic of 
construction was clear: with the impossi-
bility of a historic return and with no alter-
natives for the integration into the market, 
there seemed to remain no other option but 
exclusion. Hence, liberalism is not an “in-
tellectual fashion” that comes and withers 
away with time, but a deeply ingrained and 
probably lasting constituent of the rising 
post-communist welfare regime.
As it was shown, another peculiarity of 
the Hungarian case is the extensive utiliza-
tion of the state’s financial and power re-
sources for corporatist drives but, unlike in 
the classical cases, the attempts in question 
aim at steadily expanding the private market. 
In other words, the rather strong tendency of 
Western corporatism toward de-commodifi-
cation does not apply here. To the contrary, 
the post-communist reforms have brought 
about a pronounced trend of re-commodi-
fication. Here, again, the immediate prehis-
tory is decisive. De-commodification in its 
extreme form was, as said, one of the most 
essential cornerstones of state-socialism. Its 
genuine function was lying, however, far 
from both the ideological principles of the 
regime and the one-time claims of the work-
clearly defined regime-clusters exist depends, then, on the extent to which regime-specific features are exclusi-
vely present only in one type. To give an example, we would not expect a conservative-type system (with strong 
corporatism and/or civil-service privileges) to also harbor liberalist traits (such as a large private market) or 
socialist traits (such as universalism).” (Esping-Andersen, 1990.:69) – The later vast literature inspired by his 
book left unchallenged this thesis (For a summary of the related works and their contribution to the characteri-
zation of the three models, see Hicks and Kenworthy, 2002.).
28 For a most insightful discussion of this structure and also its political manifestations in the 1920s and 
1930s, see Bibó (1991.) and Szabó (1989.).
Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006.
331
Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...
ers’ movement: it was primarily to suppress 
wages in order to speed up industrialization 
through the over-centralization of all pos-
sible resources. Nevertheless, the seriously 
curtailed purchasing power of society had 
to be compensated somehow: the inven-
tion was the vast “de-commodification” of 
services that became directly rendered by 
the central state – though under the strict-
est possible control and, obviously, on the 
lowest possible level. 
In the light of these developments, the 
silent struggle for the expansion of the sec-
ond economy outlined earlier can be inter-
preted as a fight for two distinct, though in-
terrelated, goals: for re-commodification as 
the way for material advancement, and for 
the concomitant expansion of the market to 
loose the party-state’s potentials to halt fur-
therance. In other words, the enlargement of 
the market and re-commodification of ear-
lier free provisions were seen together as 
those warranting liberation and affluence. 
And it was the corporatist traditions used 
toward such liberal ends that were put in 
motion, first, to erode, then to effectively 
deconstruct the state. In this regard, the 
post-communist reforms simply pulled to 
light what had been accomplished before.
In sum, corporatism and liberalism are 
strongly interwoven in the welfare regime 
of today’s Hungary. The peculiar triangle 
of the deserting state, the expanding pri-
vate market, and the firmly sealed ghetto 
of the poor seems to be securely grounded 
by historical structures and contemporary 
power relations alike. True, the increasingly 
manifest tendencies of social disintegration 
might sooner or later conclude in a sudden 
explosion that reshapes the entire frame-
work. But without such gravely unwanted 
developments, the construction promises to 
work for some time to come. And if this is 
the case, then we have justified reasons to 
name what we see here: it is the corporatist-
liberal fourth world of welfare capitalism 
that grew out of state-socialism. 
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Sažetak
SIROMAŠTVO I ZAMKE POSTKOMUNISTIČKIH SOCIJALNIH REFORMI 
U MAĐARSKOJ: NOVI IZAZOVI PRIDRUŽIVANJA EU
Julia Szalai
Institut za sociologiju Mađarske akademije znanosti
Budimpešta, Mađarska
Tijekom procesa tranzicije i pridruživanja, pitanja pravičnosti i učinkovitosti socijal-
nog sustava izbilo je u prvi plan javnih rasprava i polititičkih prepirki u Mađarskoj. 
Ključna pitanja odnosila su se na tip socijalne države koja se uzdigla na ruševinama sta-
rog socijalističkog režima. Autorica istražuje sliči li nova socijalna država bilo kojem od 
»tri svijeta socijalnog kapitalizma«, koja je uloga Europske unije u njihovu stvaranju i 
jesu li razlike samo pitanje razine gospodarskog razvoja ili dublje ukorijenjenih sustavnih 
uzroka i mjera. Prvi dio članka prikazuje različite poglede na transformaciju socijalističke 
države, a nakon toga predstavljaju se ideološki i politički argumenti koji su u pozadini 
provedenih mjera u području socijalne politike, kao i šira uloga tih mjera u sveukupnoj 
gospodarskoj transformaciji. Autorica ukazuje na to da su posljedice tih mjera u socijal-
noj politici, prvenstveno povećanje siromaštva, mnogo trajnije, iako ih se često smatra 
prolaznima. Isto tako, gospodarski oporavak nije doveo do poboljšanja socijalnih usluga 
i socijalne pomoći na lokalnoj razini. Drugi dio članka nudi kritički prikaz uzroka koji su 
doveli do takvog kontrasta između najavljenih ciljeva i stvarnih rezultata reforme. Autor-
ica tvrdi da kombinirani koraci smanjivanja financiranja i decentraliziranja odluka nisu 
smanjili siromaštvo, usprkos tome što se isprva očekivalo povećanje učinkovitosti, bolje 
planiranje i više socijalne pravde. Istovremeno, ti su koraci doveli do veće stigmatizacije 
korisnika. Autorica zaključuje da nedavni razvoj Mađarske ukazuje na kristalizaciju za-
sebnog, četvrtog tipa socijalne države koja se razvija manje ili više neovisno od utjecaja 
nadnacionalnih socijalnih aranžmana EU.
Ključne riječi: socijalna država, postsocijalistička socijalna politika, siromaštvo, ras-
ni/etnički sukob
 
